Realizing the Potential of Arbitration in Federal Agency Dispute Resolution by Breger, Marshall J.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
1991 
Realizing the Potential of Arbitration in Federal Agency Dispute 
Resolution 
Marshall J. Breger 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marshall J. Breger, Realizing the Potential of Arbitration in Federal Agency Dispute Resolution, ARB. J., 
June 1991, at 35. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Realizing the Potential of
Arbitration in Federal
Agency Dispute Resolution
By Marsha// J. Breger
p.. ol the Administrative Dis-
pute Kesoiulion Act oi 1990' estab-
lished a federal policy favoring public
sector use of mediation, minitrials,
structural settlement procedures and
other forms of alternative dispute res-
olution (ADR). The intent of the act is
to provide federal agencies with an
"inexpensive means of resolving dis-
putes as an alternative to litigation in
the Federal courts/'- In this article, I
will discuss the act's explicit approval
of the use of arbitration by administra-
tive agencies as a means ol dispute
resolution.
Tiirough fhe Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925/" Congress placed its im-
primatur on private sector arbitration.
However, arbitral techniques v '̂ere not
accepted for use in the federal sector.
Since early in the century, the comp-
troller general has repeatedly stated
that a federal agency is prohibited
from using a private arbitrator in mon-
etary claims involving the liability of
the government unless it has explicit
statutory authority to dt) so.'* While
this view of the law has not been uni-
versally accepted, there is no doubt
that the comptroller's skepticism has
chilled agency efforts to use arbitra-
tion.'̂
There have, of course, been oc-
casional explicit statutory provisions
with authorized arbitration. These
statutes include provi.sions requiring
Marshall /. Brewer is the chair of the Admiihs-
(raiivc Confernicf vf the United Stales. He
was appaiiitcd lo tin- position by President
Roiuilii Rni^dJi ill 1985.
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 has given direct
authorization to all federal government agencies to voluntarily agree
to use alternative dispute resolution (specifically arbitration) in any
type of dispute—whether disputes between the government and pri-
vate parties, interagency matters or labor-management disputes within
one agency. This law will be overseen by the Administrative Confer-
ence, which coordinates and advises agencies on the act's implementa-
tion. The Administrative Conference is a permanent federal agency
established in 1964. Its purpose is to "improve the procedures of fed-
eral agencies so that they may fairly and expeditiously carry out their
responsibilities."
arbitration under the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)** to determine the compensa-
tion a pesticide manufacturer must
pay for the use of another's data in
obtaining federal registration; permit-
ting arbitration between private par-
ties in some cases regarding Super-
fund cleanup of toxic waste^ and
permitting arbitration to determine an
employer's liability for withdrawal
from pension plans that are overseen
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.^ At the same time, binding arbi-
tration has been an enduring feature
of collective bargaining agreements
within the federal government under
Executive Order 11,491'' and the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.'"
Uncertainty as to agency author-
ity to use arbitration ended last year
with the passage of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA). The
act moots the comptroller general's
kingstanding position on general
agency use of arbitration." The act re-
quires agencies, in consultation with
the Administrative Conference of the
United States and the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service, to re-
view systematically all "administrative
programs" for ADR potential and
adopt policies addressing the use of
ADR in typical agency disputes.'- Ad-
ditionally, an agency must designate a
senior official as its dispute resolution
specialist, provide ADR training for
selected personnel and review grants
and contracts for possible inclusion of
clauses encouraging ADR use.'^
The act amends the Administra-
tive Procedure Act to include a new
subchapter entitled, "Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution in the
Administrative Process."'* New Sec-
tion 582 provides explicit statutory au-
thority for voluntary use of ADR in
federal agencies. It also indicates those
situations where such techniques, par-
ticularly arbitration, would be inap-
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propriate. The act states that an
agency "shall consider not using" ADR
if;
(1) a definitive or authoritative resolution of
the matter is rt-qiiired for precedential
value, and such a proceeding Is not likely to
be accepted generally as an authoritative
precedent;
(2) the malter involves or may bear upon
significanl questions of government policy
that require additional procedures before a
final resolution may be made, and such a
procufding would not likely serve to de-
velop a recommended policy for the
agency;
(3) maintaining established policies is of
special importance, so that variaticms
among individual decisions are not in-
creased and such a proceeding would not
likely reach consistent results among indi-
vidual decisions;
(4) the matter significantly affects persons
or organizations who are not parties to the
proceeding;
(5) a full public record of the proceeding is
important, and a dispute resolution pro-
ceeding cannot provide such a record; and
(6) the agency must maintain continuing
jurisdiction over the matter with authority
to alter the disposition of the matter in the
light of changed circumstances, and a dis-
pute resolution proceeding would interfere
with the agency's fulfilling that require-
ment.'"'
Because arbitration procedures
are more formal than other types of
ADR, and since they place decisional
authority in private hands, consider-
ation of these factors plays an espe-
cially important role in deciding
whether or not to arbitrate."" Addi-
tionally, in Section 5 of the act, a deci-
sion to arbitrate or an award which is
clearly inconsistent with the six factors
listed creates a cause of action by an
adversely affected third party to va-
cate the arbitral award.̂ -̂  For example,
an agency could not legitimately sub-
mit a basic policy or budgetary ques-
tion to an outside arbitrator. Thus, the
act takes into account concerns that
the use of ADR technic]ues in resolv-
ing government conflicts will fail tc)
yield "bright line" precedents to in-
form the public of its policy in future
disputes. Even in the universe of gov-
ernment disputes, however, the cases
where agencies need to articulate
norms, as was required of the Su-
preme Court in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,^'^ are relatively few.
Importantly, the act neither re-
quires use of ADR hy executive agen-
cies nor does it automatically disqual-
ify its use in specific situations,
histead, the act provides for a review
process in which federal agencies will
consider whether and under what cir-
cumstances ADR technicjues may help
them fulfill their statutory duties more
effectively.̂ '* Each agency is required
to designate a senior official to be the
dispute resolution specialist of the
agency. Section 3 of the act makes this
ADR specialist responsible for review-
ing disputes and implementing ADR
policies and procedures when ap-
plicable.
Besides educating agency person-
nel regarding ADR and implementing
ADR policies, the act takes various
steps to make it easier for agencies to
utilize currenf ADR expertise. The act
authorizes interagency agreements for
fhe use of "neutrals" whose names
appear on a roster of neufrals main-
"The intent of the








tained hy the Administrative Confer-
ence.^" Over the past two years, the
Administrative Conference has devel-
oped a roster of over 700 neutrals; in-
dividuals and organizations whose
experience and activities include me-
diation, facilitation, arbitration or
other ADR services.^' Moreover, the
act authorizes the Administrative
Conference, in consultation with the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, to develop standards for the
selection of neutrals including experi-
ence, training, affiliations, and actual
or potential conflicts of interest.~^
At the center of the debate regard-
ing the act's adoption was the use of
arbitration to resolve public sector dis-
putes.-' New Section 585 authorizes
arbitration under the following condi-
tions;
(a)(]) Arbitrati(m may be used as an alter-
native means of dispute resolution when-
ever all parties consent. Consent may be
obtained either before or after an issue in
controversy has arisen. A party may agree
to—
(A) submit only certain issues in
controversy to arbitration; or
(B) arbitration on the condition that
the award must be within <1 range of possi-
ble outcomes.
(2) Any arbitration agreement tiiat sets
forth the subject matter submitted to the
arbitrator shall be in writing.
(3) >\ii agency may not require any per-
son to consent to arbitration as a condition
of entering into a contract or obtaining a
benefit.
(b) An officer or employee of an agency
may offer to use arbitration for the resolu-
tion of issues in controversy, if such officer
or employee—
(1) has authority to enter into a settle-
ment concerning the matter; or
(2) is otherwise specifically authorized
by the agency to consent to the use of arbi-
The acf only authorizes volunfary
arbitration and specifies that consent
must be in writing.̂ "" Enforcement of
arbitration agreements is provided for
in Section 586. Section 587 states that
fhe parties to the arbitration are enti-
tled to select the arbitrator. Section.s
588 and 589 provide a structure for
the conduct of the proceedings and
the authority of the arbitrator over the
proceedings. Section 590 discusses ar-
bitration awards.
Section 590(b) also establishes the
right of agency heads to vacate or "opt
out" of an arbitral award within a 30-
day waiting period before it becomes
final.-" This unusual provision is
grounded in a compromise that wa.s
crucial to the act's passage. The Office
of Legal Counsel of the Department of
Justice raised numerous constitutional
concerns with respect to the use of ar-
bitration (consensual or otherwise) by
the federal governmenf.-' The cieparf-
ment suggested that arhitrators mak-
ing decisions involving the govern-
ment would be taking actions as
officers of the U.S., but would not
have heen appointed in the manner
required by the appointments
clause.̂ '̂  A related worry of the de-
partment was that, if fhe arbitrators
were not deemed to be officers of the
U.S., their service in binding arbitra-
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tion of governmental disputes might
constitute an impermissible delegation
of either the executive branch's Article
II policy-making responsibility or the
Judiciary's Article HI adjudicative re-
sponsibility to private individuals.-'*
Given its concern for the protec-
tion of executive prerogatives, the de-
partment's position is understand-
able. Nonetheless, although the
clauses (and even some of the cases)"*"
cited by the department can be con-
strued broadly to require that all gov-
ernment decision-making activity re-
main in the hands of federal officers,
they need not be read so sweepingly.
Since accountable agency officials will
retain the ultimate right to send (or
not to send) disputes to arbitration,
they will be making tiie critical policy
determination—namely, whether a
matter presents sufficiently important
issues to warrant the use of more for-
mal proceedings. Empowering gov-
ernment officials to decide when to
send an issue to arbitration establishes
an acceptable level of control in tho ex-
ecutive branch—thus satisfying any
appointments clause concerns or con-
cerns about delegation of policy-
making responsibilities."^' A variety of
federal statutes already provide specifi-
cally for agreements to resolve dis-
putes with the government by use of
private arbitrators, including cases in-
volving government liability or impli-
cating future government action.''^
The Article III argument raised by
the Justice Department concerning the
transferring of judicial power lo pri-
vate hands is similarly overly formalis-
tic. This position draws on such early
cases as United States v. Anies^-^ in
which the Circuit Court found that the
secretary of war (now called the secre-
tary of defense) exceeded his authority
when he authorized a U.S. attorney to
agree to arbitrate a dispute concerning
damage to government land. Ihe
court held that the use of arbitration
improperly vested judicial power in an
entity that was not an inferior court
created by Congress.'''' Today, admin-
istrative agencies routinely decide a
wide range of cases that were, at one
time or another, the province of the
courts/^'' and the Ames position has
been abandoned in the contemporary
"administrative state."•'"^
fn 1985, the Supreme Court in
Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) (left) sponsor of the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act, and autbor Marshall /. Brewer at the Administrative Conference's March 19 ADR
program. Breger cliairs the Administralive Conference.
Tbomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co.^^ expressly upheld a re-
quirement of binding arbitration for
certain disputes under the FIFRA
Act.̂ '̂  Under FIF'RA, the arbitrator's
decision is subject to judicial review
only on the issues of fraud, misrepre-
sentation or misconduct—a standard
of judicial review similar to that con-
tained in the Federal Arbitration Act.'*''
In rejecting Article Ill-based objections
to the requirement. Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing
for the court majority, observed that
"to hold otherwise would be to erect a
rigid and formalistic restraint on the
ability of Congress to adopt innovative
measures such as negotiation and ar-
bitration with respect to rights created
by a regulatory scheme."'"^
Civen the Justice Department's
concerns, the pending ADR legislation
was stalled in the legislative process
throughout most of 1990.̂ ' At the in-
stigation of congressional committee
chairpersons, a compromise was fash-
ioned in discussions with the Ameri-
can Bar Association, providing a 30-
day waiting period before an arbitral
award becomes final,'*^ and authoriz-
ing an agency head to vacate any
award within this waiting period. Ab-
sent extenuating circumstances, a de-
cision to vacate an arbitration award in
the 3n-day period before finality will
require the agency to pay the private
party's expenses and the fees of the
arbitration proceedings."'^
For this arrangement to make
sense, we must assume that the gov-
ernment will rarely use its "opt out"
power. In its testimony before the
Hloiise judiciary Subcommittee on Ad-
ministrative Law and Governmental
Relations, the department stated:
"[Wje expect that an agency head
would seldom vacate an award."''' In
indicating his support tor the compro-
mise, then-Assistant Attorney General
William Barr expressed the expecta-
tion that agency heads would exercise
this authority to vacate an arbitral
award only in "unusual" cases.'''̂
Should this indeed be the case, arbi-
tration may yet become a valuable
ADR device for government agencies.
I would venture to say that any agency
whose head vacates a significant num-
ber of awards will find exceedingly
few takers for its subsequent offers to
arbitrate. Thus the "30-day" delayed
finality process raises a number of is-
sues, only some of which are an-
swered by the statute. The success of
the arbitral mechanism, therefore, de-
pends in very large measure on gov-
ernment "good faith."
The act's provision for attorney
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fees in arbitral cases applies only in
cases where the agency head vacates
an arbitral award to which the agency
was a party. Limited attorney fees cov-
ering expenses incurred only during
the arbitral phase would be paid if an
award is made bv an arbitrator and
then vacated by the agency head.
Since the act's "opt-out" authority is
unilateral (i.e., only the government
has it), the attorney tee provision was
viewed by several members of Con-
gress as crucial to ensure compensa-
tory balance in the implementation of
the law.
The act specifies a largely auto-
matic fee award process that is simple
and straightforward, it takes advan-
tage of existing agency processes for
handling applications under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA)/" while
avoiding the contentious EAJA ques-
tion of whether the government's po-
sition had "substantial justification.""''
It would compensate ail private par-
ties—not just "small" entities as pro-
vided under EAJA^except in those
rare cases where "special circum-
stances make an award of expenses
unjust."'^ Parties will be compensated
for all reasiinable expenses (as defined
by EAJA) that would not have been
incurred but for the arbitral proceed-
ing. In this regard the Senate report on
its ADR bill (S. 971) noted:
Tho section provides that, in the event
an agency vacates an award or terminates
an arbitration, any party to the arbitration
other than the United States may petition
tor attorney tees and expenses pursuant to
the Equal Acces.s to Justice Act (EAJA). This
petition may be filed with a court or admin-
istrative law judge using the standards for
recovery articulated in the KAJA. The sec-
tion references the EAJA in order to make
use of the complex body of law already de-
veloped under that statute and to ensure
that persons usuig ADR procedures have
the same rights as persons who engage in
litigation.
The section also provides that, ii or-
dered by a court or administrative law
judge, payment for such attorney fees and
expenses must be taken from the tunds of
the agency that vacated the arbitration
award or terminated the arbitration pro-
ceedings. The purpose of this provision is
twofold; (1) to reimburse parties who en-
gaged in the arbitration process for their
out-of-pocket expenses, and (2) to provide
an incentive for agencies to abide by an ar-
bitration by making them otherwise liable
for the other parties' costs.''"
Currently under section 504(b)
(l)(A)(ii) (agency adjudicahon) of
HAJA and 28 U.S.C. 2412 (d)(l)(C)(2)
(court cases), attorney fee awards are
limited to $75 an hour plus a higher
amount if the agency by regulation or
the court determines that special fac-
tors are present, such as cost of living
increases or a shortage of qualified at-
torneys. Additionally, courts may au-
thorize higher rates on a case-by-case
basis. If an agency believes tbat it is
necessary to pay higher maximum
rates, the agency must adopt those
rates by rulemaking or administrative
proceedings. To date, no agencies
have done so. The expenses fhat may
be awarded include expert witness
fees and the cosf of studies or tests
necessary for case preparation.
The Administrative Conference
has noted that "most knowledgeable
government officials, contractors and
attorneys agree that government con-
tract appeals have become too oner-
ous, too expensive and too time-
consuming."''" The new ADR Act
provides a basis to reverse this trend.
The act amends the Contract Disputes
Act̂ ' to encourage agency contracting
officers and boards of contract appeals
to use consensual methods to settle ac-
quisition disputes."^^ It specifically au-
thorizes use of ADR, including arbitra-
tion, on contract disputes, and calls
for related changes that will greatly
enhance parties' flexibility to resolve
claims via minitriais and other infor-
mal means in an area where litigation
has increased almost exponentially in
recent years.
Under the new act, arbitration
and other forms of ADR can be used
either at the contracting officer level or
after a case has been appealed to an
agency board of contract appeals. The
act requires thai the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation - the body of rules
that govern federal agency acquisition
of goods and services—be amended to
permit agencies to make greater use of
ADR, including arbitration.'-* Addi-
tionally, Section 3(d)(l) of the act re-
quires tbat every agency with grant or
contract administrative program func-
tions review its standard contracts or
assistance agreements to determine
whether to amend them to include
language that would authorize and
encourage ADR use. The Administra-
tive Conference is presently develop-
ing a recommended model ADR
clause (including arbitration) lor gov-
ernment contracfs.
Tbe new act also serves to encour-
age settlement by the federal govern-
ment by amending the Federal Tort
Claims Act̂ '' to authorize explicitly the
use of ADR. The act permits the attor-
Charles E. Pou jr., attorney for the Administrative Conference and coordinator of its
Roster of Neutrals, fflto with attendees at recent proi^ram for federal af^eiicy ADR
specialists.
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Sen. Charles Crasslei/ (R-lozva), another
sponsor of the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act.
ncy general to increase the present,
ceiling on agency sctlJcment authority
to the amount currently delegated to
U.S. attorneys.^'' The Tort Claims Act
had contained a ceiling set decades
ago of $25,000, which required Justice
Department approval of many pro-
posed settlement agreements in small
cases that raise no legal or policy is-
sues. Since agencies often could not
negotiate effectively with private at-
torneys when they could not "clinch"
a settlement that was over $25,000
without recourse to Justice Depart-
ment review, the present level served
tu chill settlement discussions. A simi-
lar change in the Federal Claims Col-
lection Act'''' permits a raise in agency
authority to settle those cases from the
current $20,000 to $100,000.
The new act means that ADR is
likely to be a significant part of agen-
cies' futures, ready or not. As Court of
Appeals Judge Harry Edwards—one
of the early skeptics about ADR in
public disputes—said when he
chaired a panel discussion at last sum-
mer's Judicial Conference, "ADR is
here. How can we make it work?""''
These methods will be an increasingly
important phenomenon in the years to
come. The act represents a mandate,
and an opportunity, lor agency per-
sonnel to become educated in these
processes and begin to implement
them. Should they do so, both they
and the public they serve will benefit
immensely. •
ENDNOTES
' Adnii[-ii.>;tMtivo Dispute RfNclution Act of 19911
(horcinattfr, in bolh footnotes and text, "the
act"). Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat- 2736 (codi-
fied in scaltcrcd sections of 9 U.S.C. and 5
U.S.C, and adds 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-95 (1990)).
= Id. at § 2.
' The Federal Arbitration Act (formorly the
United States Arbitration Acf) was first enacted in
1925, 43 Stat. 883. tt wa."̂  codified in 1947, 61 Stai.
669 (codified at 9 U.S.C, § 1 ef seq., and amended
in 1954, 68 Stat, 1233 and in 1971], 84 Stat. 692. See
Robert Lawrence Co. v. l\-vonshire Fabrics, Inc.. 271
F.2d 402 {CA2 NY 1959), cert, granted, 362 U.S.
909 (1960), cerl. dismisfeii pursuant to ulipulation.
364 U.S. 801 (1960).
One of Ihe dark chapters in lej;al histor}'
concerns the validity, interpretation and
enforceability of arbitration agreements.
i*rom the standpoint of businessmen
generally and of those immediately af-
fected by such agreements they were
beneficial and salutary in every way. But
to the conrts and to the judges they were
anathema. . . . Suffice it to say for a
considerable time prior to the passage of
the Arbitration Act in 1925 the Congress
had come to the conclusion that an effort
should be made to legislate on the sub-
ject of arbitration in such fashion as io
remove the hostility of the judiciary and
make the benefits of arbitration gener-
ally available to the business world,
hi. al 4llfS- 7, For a discussion of common law and
statutory arbitration of private rights, see gener-
ally M. Domke, Ccmimereia! Arbitration (Deerfield,
II: Callaghan & Co., revised ed, 1984).
^ For example, 5 Comp. Gen. 417 (1925); 8 Comp,
Cen. 96 (1928). The General Accounting Office
based its posifion on (1) an expansive reading of
31 U,S,C, § 1346 (1988) (formerly §§ 672, 673)
which prohibits the use of federal funds to pay
"(A) the pay or expenses of a commission, coun-
cil, board, or similar group, or a member of that
j;roup; |or] (B) expenses related to the work or
results of work or action of that group" unless
authorized by a specific statute; and (2) 31 U.S.C.
^ 3702 (1988) which states that "fhe Comptroller
General shall settle all claims of or against the
United States Government," See also 31 U,S.C,
§ 3526 (1988) (Comptroller General's jurisdiction
over settlement of federal accounts).
The Comptroller General has argued that the
existence of statutes providing explicit authority
to arbitrate dispute.s indicates a contrary intent
when a statute is silent. For example, 32 Comp,
Gen. 333, 335 (1953), For a detailed analysis and
history of the Comptroller General's position, see
Berg, Les-fl/ and Structural Obslacles to the Use of
Alternatiui' Dis^pute Resolution for Claims for and
Against Ibe federal Government, Administrative
Conference of the U.S,, Studies in Administrative
Law ami Procedure 88-1, 43-73; Hardy & Cargill,
"Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why
Not Arbitrate," 34 federal Par iournai {1975): 1, 1 f •
14, reprinted in Administrative Conference of the
U,S,, Sourcebook: Federai Agency Use of Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution (Office of the Chair-
man, 1987) (hereinafter, Sourcebook) at 361-364;
Behre, "Arbitration: A Permissible or Desirable
Method for Resolving Disputes Involving Federal
Acquisition and Assistance Contracts?," 16 Con-
tract t.aw journal (1986): 66, 74-79, reprinted in
Sourtebook ai 382-387; Harter, Points on a Contin-
uum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Adminis-
trative Process (report to the Administrative Con-
ference, June 5, 1986), reprinted in Soureebook,
309, 321-325.
In 1921 the Bureau of Ihe Budget considered
but rejected use of arbitration in contract appeals.
During World War II, arbitration was again con-
sidered: several pieces of legislation were intro-
duced to permit arbitrafion but did not pass. See.
e.g., Braucher, "Arbitrafion Under Government
Contracts," 17 Liiv & Contemporary Problems,
(1952): 473; Greske, "Settlement of War Conh-act
Disputes," 29 Ainerican Bar Association loiirniil
(1943): 13. Only in Executive Order 9017 regard-
ing tbe powers of the National War Labor Board
was arbitration mentioned as a means of dispute
resolution. Execufive Order No. 9t)17, 3 C.F.R.
1075 (1938-1943) gave the National War Labor
Board broad authority to "finally determine the
dispule, and for this purpose . . . use mediation,
voluntary arbitration, or arbitrafion under rules
established hy the Board." See Teller. "The War
Labor Board and Management Functions," 21
New York University Law Review (1946); 319; Sym-
posium, "An Oral Historj' oi the Nafional War
Labor Board and Critical Issues in tbe Develop-
ment of Modern Grievance Arbitration." 39 Case
Western Reserve (1989): 505.
^ 1 have found only one example of an agency
effort to arbitrate contract disputes without ex-
plicit statutor\' authorization. An appeals board
laler found fhat the Department of Interior had
arbitrated without statutory authority, frames and
Moore, Inc., IBCA No. 1308"-IO-79, 81-2BCA76.
393 (Oct, 27. 1981), The Adminisb-ative Confer-
ence of Ihe United States, see 1 C.F,R. §305,86-3.
(1990) reprinted in Sourceiiook, supra note 4 at 113,
and many others have recommended a more ex-
pansive use of arbitration by administrative agen-
cies. See Hardy & Cargill, sitprn note 4, at 351,
3.S3; Berg, supra note 4 (argues that G.A.O.'s ob-
jections are without legal foundation).
'•7 U.S.C. §̂  I36-I36y (1988).
'42U.S,C, §9612(b)(4)(l988);4C)C,F,R. §30^.10-
52.
« 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988);29C.F,R. §2641,1-.13.
''Executive Order No, 11,491, Labor-Manage-
ment Relafions in the Federal Service, § 14 Arbi-
trafion of Grievances, 34 Fed. Reg, 17605 (Oct, 21,
1969). Motably. in this context, the General Ac-
counfing Office has consistenfiy recognized the
resulting arbitral awards as valid. See, for exam-
ple, 54 Comp, Gen, 312 (1974),
'"5 U,S,C, §719(1988); 39 U,S,C, ii 1207(1988),
" I'uh. L, No, 101-552, g 2(7) states: "Federal
agencies may not only receive [he benefit of tech-
niques Ihat were developed in the private sector,
but may also take the lead in the further develop-
ment and refinement of such technit|ues,"
'- rut>. L, No, 101-552, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 2736-37
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 581). Administrafive pro-
gram: "includes a Federal function whicb in-
volves protection of the public interest and tbe
determination of rights, privileges, and obliga-
tions of private persons through rule making, ad-
judicafion, licensing, or investigation, a.s those
terms are used in subchapter II of this chapter;"
Id. § 4(b), § 581. (Definitions), 104 St.it. at 2738.
"Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 3(b). (c) and (d). 104
Stat. at 2737.
'•• Pub, L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. a[ 2738
(codified at 5 U,S.C. § 58^-593),
'•̂  Pub. L, No, 101-552. § 4(h). lt)4 Stat. at 2739
(codified at 5 U.S,C., § .S82(b)).
'"S. Rep. No. 543. 101st Cong., 2nd Sess, 10,
reprinted in United States Code Con;^ressional and
Administrative News (1990): 3931, 3940.
'•'• Pub. L.No. 101-552. §5. 104 Stat. at 2745 (codi-
fied, as amended, ai 9 U.S.C, § 10) regarding ju-
dicial review ot arbitration awards provides:
(b) fbe United States district court for
the district wherein an award was made
that was issued pursuant to section 590
of title 5 may make an order vacating the
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militatinf; against using ADR, creating a third
party right of review mifihl result in j;re<Tler
agency caution wben choosing arbitration to re-
solve disputes,
'M49 U.S. 294 (1955).
'" Pub. I.. Mo. im-552, § 4|b), U)4 Stal. at 273'5
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 582(c)) ("Alternative means
of dispute resolution authorized under this sub-
chapter are voluntary procedures which supple-
ment rather than limit other available agency dis-
pute resolution techniques.").
"̂ Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. at 2739
(codified at 5 U.S.C, § 583).
" ."i U.S.C at§583(c)(2), 1 C.F.K. Part 31C> (1991).
•• 5 U.S.C. at § .'i83(c)(l). Regarding conflicts ol"
interest, § 583(a) states: "A neutral shall have no
official, financial, or personal conflict ot interest
with respect to tbe issues in controversy, unless
such interest is fully disclosed in writing to all
parties and all parties agree that the neutral mav
serve,"
-^Pub, L, No, 101-552, §4(b) and §5 , Itl4Stat. at
2742-45 (codified at 5 U,S.C. §§ 585 591) and SJ
U,S,C. 6 10), Unlike other ADR techniques men-
tioned in the Act, arbitration is discu.ssed in con-
siderable detail. In part, this is to emphasize the
concurrent authorit}' of the Federal Arbitration
Act over any public sector arbitration. See S, Rep.
No, 543, Supra note 16 at 3942, regarding Pub. I..
No, 1(11 -552, §4(h), 104 Stat. at 2742 (codified at 3
U,S.C. § 586) (enforcement ot" arbitration agree-
ments),
'-^5 U.S,C, at §585.
•̂̂  5 U.S.C, at ^ 585(a)(2). In contrast, ^ 582(a)
states thai an agency may use an ADR proceed-
ing if the parties consent, without any require-
ment that sueb consent be reduced to a writing,
-^5 U.S.C, at g 590(c), Section 590(e) provides
that a vacated arbitration award is not admissible
in a later proceeding on the issues m controversy,
^̂  For example, The Adini}ii^trathv Dispute Resolu-
tion Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Lazv and Governmental Relations oj Ihe !lou:^e
Comm. on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 42-
47 (1990) (Testimony of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral William P. Barr, Office of Legal Counsel, De-
partment of Justice); The Adniinistralwe Dispute
Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing'^ Before tlw Sukouitn.
on Oversight of Cavernmctit Maiiai^etncnt ol the Sen-
ate Comyn. on Govfrninenta! Affairs. lOIst Cong.,
1st Sess., 86, 93-102 ("1989) (Prepared statement
of Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
28 U.S. Const, art. II, ^ 2, cl . 2. ("Officers of tbe
United States" shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent, Ihe courts or the "Heads of Departments.")
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Federal
Election Commissioners could noi he appointed
by Congress),
*̂ !d. art, II, § 3 (President's responsibility to take
care that the laws he faithf\illy executed); id. art.
Ill §§ 1-2 (vesting judicial power over cases and
controversies arising under the constitution),
^ See, for example, Ruckley sufirii note 28,
" BrutI, "Tbe Conslilutionality of Arbitration in
i-ederal Programs," Aiiministralive Conference of
Ihe United States: Recomntcndtitions imd Reports,
Vol. I, 553 (I9H7). See also "A Colloquium on
Improving Dispute [Resolution; Options for the
i-ederal Government," 1 Aihniiustrativc iiur jour
nal (1987): .399 (includes remarks of Harold Briitl
on ihis point using examples Irom various stat-
utes thai permit arbitration ol disputes); see also
t-upra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
« See, for example, 22 U.S.C. g 2398 (19K8) (in-
vestment guaranties under foreign assistance
programs); 46 U,S.C. 6 749 (1988) (Suits in Admi-
ralty Act); 4(1 U,S.C, § 7Hfi (1988) (arbitraHon,
ciimpromise or sfttlemenl under the Public Ves-
sel.s Acl); 5 U,S.C, g 1 l(}l(c)(5)(l')88) (binding ar-
bitration ot employee grievances under collective
bargaining agreements pursuant to the Civil Ser-
vice kctorm Act oî  1978), For a discussiiin of stat-
ules which include arbitration provisions, see
generaliy Harter, "Dispute Resolution and .Ad-
ministrative law: The History, Needs, and Fu-
ture of A Complex Relationship," 29 Villanoi'a
Uiw Review (1983-4): 1393, reprinted in Sourcebwk
nt 119,
" 24 F, Cas, 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). See Hardv
and Cargill, suprii note 4, at 360-M. ("Instead ol
being used as a bar to arbitration by the Govern-
ment today, Anirs should more properly be
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" Ames, 24 F, Cas, at 789.
*' See Pierce, "Morrison v. Olson: Separation oi
Powers and the Structure of tbe Government,"
Supreme Court Rez'iew {19SH): I, 15
'" In United States v, l-arragut. S9 LLS, (22 Wall.)
406 (1874), the Court upheld arbitration vvbere
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The plan of Article 111 courts in the adjudica-
tive landscape is brilliantly canvassed in Bator,
"The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative
and Administrative Courts Under Article III," Ii5
Indiana Liw lournal (19911): 2.33. See also Fallon,
"Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article III," 101 Harvard hiw Revieic (1988):
915.
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^' Pub. L. No. IOl-552§59O(g), 104 Stat. at 2744
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